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Public Interest Litigation in India as a,
Paradigm for Developing Nations
ZACHARY HOLLADAY*
ABSTRACT

Public interest litigation (PIL) in India can serve as a vehicle for
creating and enforcing rights and is critical to the sustenance of
democracy. PIL in India can address the needs of its citizens when
legislative inertia afflicts the Indian National Congress. This Note
discusses how PIL in India can serve as a model for other developing
nations struggling with legislative inertia and can provide recourse to
marginalizedand disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, while PIL
obscures the traditional boundaries of power in a liberal democratic
polity, democracy is in fact strengthened by the expansion of standing to
include any citizen who has suffered a rights abuse.
INTRODUCTION

India is a nation of seemingly infinite paradoxes. This was apparent
in my visit to India during the summer of 2010 when I had the
opportunity to intern at a women's rights organization called Jagori
(which in Hindi means "awakening"). Jagori is dedicated to promoting
women's rights in a variety of ways, including providing legal advice to
victims of domestic violence, researching and developing policy
initiatives that address rights disparities, and counseling victims of
domestic and communal violence. Through my experiences with this
organization, I became aware of one of the most perplexing, and indeed
frustrating, paradoxes of India: the coexistence of refreshingly
progressive laws and a record of haphazard implementation.

* J.D. 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. University of South
Florida. I am greatly indebted to Professor Jay Krishnan for the opportunity to participate
in the inaugural India summer internship program. I would also like to thank my mom
and my grandmother, because without their unconditional love and support, I would not
be the person I am today.

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 19 #2 (Summer 2012)
© Indiana University Maurer School of Law

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

19:2

The Constitution of India resembles the U.S. Constitution in many
respects, including its commitment to fundamental rights to freedom of
speech and expression and to equality. Legislation, such as the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DVA), supplements
these constitutional provisions and advances their goals. The DVA,
legislation that Jagori sought to educate women about, is but one of
many examples of progressive laws that aim to tackle rights abuses.
One of the many purposes of the DVA, passed in 2005, was to articulate
the duties and responsibilities of protection officers, shelter homes, and
medical facilities when addressing complaints from female victims of
violence.' Not only does the DVA extend protection to the wife or female
live-in partner from domestic abuse (including physical, sexual, verbal,
and economic abuse) at the hands of her husband or male live-in
2
partner, but also from unlawful dowry demands from her in-laws.
Five years since its inception, the protections afforded by the DVA
have yet to fully materialize. The data accumulated from extensive field
research strongly indicates a failure among law enforcement
institutions to execute their duties to arrest and prosecute those accused
of perpetrating violence against women. 3 Among the reasons for this
deficiency of responsibility to comply with the statute include police
corruption and individual apprehension to pierce the sacrosanct realm
4
of the private.
Jagori aims to combat the lack of enforcement of the DVA through a
uniquely Indian judicial mechanism known as public interest litigation
(PIL), which serves as a tool for protecting the rights of India's
impoverished and disadvantaged. In conjunction with Action India,
another nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Delhi, Jagori is in the
process of accumulating data from all police precincts in Delhi to
determine any discrepancy between the reports and investigations of
violence against women. The remedy the organizations seek is a form of

1. See The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, INDIA
CODE (2005), vol. 15.
2. Id.

3. This data was gathered in a collective effort among several NGOs in India,
including Jagori and Action India. See generally Amy Hornbeck et al., The Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act: Solution or Mere Paper Tiger?, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L.
REV. 273 (2007) (noting the lack of enforcement in this area).
4. From my encounters with women at Jagori, the police are hesitant to investigate
such matters because of an implicit social constraint on delving into private matters. One
could argue that the State itself condones such inaction because of its policy of neutrality
toward religious, or personal, laws, which govern private matters such as divorce,
inheritance, and child custodial rights. The unfortunate consequence of balancing
collective and individual rights has effectively allowed for the subordination of women,
especially Muslim women, in India.
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equitable relief compelling police precincts to investigate such crimes in
a manner consistent with the procedures established by Parliament. I
became intimately aware of the mechanics of PIL in India, as it was my
responsibility as an intern with the organization to peruse Supreme
Court and Delhi High Court opinions regarding gender justice to extract
language pertinent to Jagori's case and provide an informed opinion
regarding the case's likelihood of success.
Through my research at the organization, I discovered the especially
omnipotent power of the Indian courts. PIL allows for any individual
who claims a violation of one of her or his fundamental rights, as
enshrined in the Constitution, to bypass the local courts and appeal
directly to one of the state's High Courts or to the Supreme Court. 5 The
preferred remedy is often in the form of equitable relief, such as an
injunction, to compel the government to take appropriate measures to
redress violations of fundamental rights. In many instances, however,
the courts will assume a more legislative role in enforcing rights
through the issuance of writs of mandamus that force the government to
pass legislation dealing with rights disparities. For example, in a sexual
harassment case, the Supreme Court enacted anti-harassment
guidelines that function effectively as law.6 These approaches
underscore the apparent lack of trust in the legislature to carry out its
duties.
This Note examines PIL in India as a model for addressing rights
abuses in other developing nations. Specifically, this Note argues that
the Indian model of PIL can serve as a vehicle for creating and enforcing
rights necessary to the successful functioning of a liberal democracy.
Section I of this analysis provides relevant background information
about PIL in India, including its historical underpinnings and the
logistics of its operation. Section II briefly describes the theory of liberal
democracy. Section III interlaces PIL and liberal democratic theory to
show how the judiciary acts to redistribute justice in an effort to level
the playing field in a nation with severe resource disparities. Finally,
Section IV considers the Indian model of PIL as an instrument for
addressing rights disparities in other developing nations.

5. See generally Nick Robinson, ExpandingJudiciaries:India and the Rise of the Good
Governance Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2009) (describing the Indian
judiciary as a two-tiered system composed of an upper judiciary, which includes the High
Courts and the Supreme Court, and a lower judiciary, which is comprised of district courts
and specialty courts, such as family and property courts).

6. See Visaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
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I. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA
A. History of Public Interest Litigation in India
In India, PIL assumes many of the same characteristics of its
relative enterprise in the United States, including a liberal
understanding of party joinder and a preference for equitable relief,
such as an injunction, as a remedy.7 Yet the comparisons end there. PIL
in the United States requires a great deal of expenditure, thus limiting
its exercise to those individuals and firms with adequate financial
resources. Many Indian citizens and firms, however, lack those
resources, so PIL requires a different approach. Additionally, the issues
advocated through PIL are substantively different. Justice Bhagwati
has described the goal of PIL in India as endeavoring to counter "state
repression, governmental lawlessness, administrative deviance, and
exploitation of disadvantaged groups and denial to them of their rights
and entitlements."8 Hence, the PIL instrument serves to counter
parliamentary inertia and governmental neglect. Perhaps the most
distinguishing feature of PIL in India is that the Supreme Court rules of
locus standi, or the eligibility of a person to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts, are so relaxed that anyone asserting a violation of fundamental
rights can file a claim in one of the appellate courts.
To understand how PIL began in India, it is necessary to recognize
the propitious conditions under which it arose. During the 1970s, a
majority of Indians suffered from a severe lack of access to justice. Legal
fees were prohibitively expensive to the extent that only the few could
afford representation. 9 Moreover, the lack of education for many rural
Indians meant that most people were unaware of their legal rights, and
lawyers working on their behalf were few and far between. 10
Compounding the dire situation of many of India's citizens, then-Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi-the daughter of India's first prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru-suspended elections and civil liberties in response
to great political upheaval that threatened her premiership, a time in
Indian history known as the Emergency Period (June 25, 1975 to March
7. See Ranjan K Agarwal, The Barefoot Lawyers: Prosecuting Child Labour in the
Supreme Court of India, 21 ARiZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 663, 688-90 (2004).

8. P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 561, 569 (1985).

9. Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of
Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIs. INT'L L.J. 57, 63 (1994).
10. See id. at 64-65 (noting the story is further complicated "by a political undercurrent
of double standards," which permeates Indian society with entrenched divisions along
caste, religious, gender, economic, and cultural lines rendering justice variable and
concentrated among the advantaged).
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21, 1977). 11 Many citizens were expecting the Supreme Court to
intervene. The Court failed to do so and instead capitulated to Indira
Gandhi's autocratic tendencies. 12 In fact the Court held in A.D.M.
Jabalpurv. Shivakant Shukla, a severely criticized case, 13 that certain
fundamental rights, including the right to liberty, did not survive the
executive's proclamation of emergency. 14 That decision only served to
erode further the Court's esteem.
The Supreme Court's expansion of locus standi, therefore, traces its
roots to post-Emergency Period efforts to recapture its legitimacy. After
the Emergency Period ended in 1977, when Indira Ghandi and her allies
in the Congress party lost in the elections, the Court was rendered
impotent in the eyes of the Indian public. The Supreme Court responded
to this sentiment of unpopularity by expanding its jurisdiction to better
15
secure those civil liberties threatened during the Emergency Period.
In 1978, the Supreme Court received a letter from an inmate
detailing the gruesome torture of a fellow inmate at the hands of the
prison guards. The note, a mere scribble on a piece of paper, prompted
the Court to assume jurisdiction over the case, ruling that a prisoner
was entitled to the same rights and liberties conferred on the rest of
society. 16 The case opened the floodgates to a litany of public interest
claims, assuming virtually every form, including media reports, formal
17
briefs, and letters.
One of the provisions of the Constitution that the courts rely on to
create new rights and enforce existing rights is Article 21, which states,
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law."' 8 Under this Article, the
Supreme Court has questioned the validity of death sentences and
articulated the right to privacy. The Court has read this Article broadly
to encompass various socioeconomic rights as well, such as rights to
education, 19 clean air, 20 and food and clothing. 21 With respect to
11. See Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency. Preventive
Detention and PersonalLiberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 311, 344-47 (2001).
12. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 31-33.
13. S.P. Sathe, JudicialActivism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 29,
47 (2001).
14. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207.
15. See id. at 42.
16. Sathe, supra note 13, at 73.
17. In expanding its jurisdiction, the Court relied on Article 32 of the Constitution,
which guarantees "[t]he right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings" for
the enforcement of fundamental rights. INDIA CONST. art. 32, § 1.
18. INDIA CONST. art. 21. Additional provisions the courts rely on in deciding PIL cases
include Articles 14 (right to equality), 16 (right to equal opportunity), and 19 (right to
freedom of speech).
19. See Jain v. Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658, 660 (India).
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women's rights, advocates have invoked Article 21 to combat child
23
marriages 22 and coerced sterilization practices.
Many Indians, especially those in the NGO community, have
celebrated the broad rendering of Article 21. NGOs rely on the Article to
combat the rights abuses they encounter everyday in the field.
Supporters of PIL argue that it is critical to "compensate for the
inaction of the legislative and executive branches of government."24 This
inertia has been attributed to several causes, including a severely
fractured Parliament, as well as "bureaucratic hurdles . . . and
corruption 'of a tremendous order."' 25 For many, the courts serve as
guardians of political, social, and economic rights, providing relief in the
event of parliamentary failure. This societal cognizance of the Court as
the purveyor of rights has inflated public support for the institution and
prompted a significant degree of confidence in its capacity to "surely do
26
something" about the problems of the underprivileged.
Despite a considerable amount of public support since PIL has been
entrenched as a trademark of the Supreme Court, the judiciary has
received criticism for its tendency to overreach. Often, the judiciary will
encroach upon the administrative and policy functions of the legislature
to protect the rights of the disadvantaged. At the heart of this criticism
is a fear of "judicial despotism"; that courts will take over the total
administration of the more politically accountable bodies of
government. 27
B. Mechanics of Public Interest Litigation
Since PIL began in the late 1970s, thousands of suits have been
instituted before the courts through the agency of "public interest."
However, despite the lowering of the threshold, many Indians are still
unable to use, or are denied access to, the courts; "widespread poverty,
bonded labor, social restrictions and illiteracy all [pose] real bars to

20. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) Supp. 10 S.C.R. 973 (India).
21. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630 (India).
22. Petition for Writ, Forum for Fact Finding Documentation & Advocacy v. Union of
India (2003) (No. 212) (India).
23. Petition for Writ, Ramakant Rai v. Union of India (2005) (No. 209) (India).
24. Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies
from India, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 845 (2008).
25. Id. at 846 (quoting an Interview with Fali Nariman, Senior Supreme Court
Advocate and Former Solicitor General of India, in New Delhi, India (Mar. 10, 2006)).
26. Id. at 847 (quoting Confidential Interviews with Low-Income Women Residing in
Urban Slums, in New Delhi, India (Mar. 23, 2006 & Apr. 10, 2006)).
27. Agarwal, supra note 7, at 696-97.
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legal rights."28 Therefore, the courts have allowed for third-party
standing. Justice Bhagwati, in holding that social and economic
conditions necessitate this model of standing, stated:
When a person or class of persons to whom legal injury
is caused by violation of a fundamental right is unable to
approach the Court for judicial redress on account of
poverty or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position, any member of the public acting
can
move
the
Court
for
relief
bona
fide
under Article 32 ... so that the fundamental rights may
become meaningful not only for the rich and the well-todo who have the means to approach the Court but also
for the large masses of people who are living a life of
want and destitution and who are by reasons of lack of
awareness, assertiveness and resources unable to seek
29
judicial redress.
Hence, this expansion of standing has enabled Indian NGOs, such
as Jagori, Human Rights Law Network (HRLN), and Lawyers
Collective, to collaborate with each other in fact-finding and dataaccumulation efforts to ensure that public interest actions are pursued
in a bona fide manner. 30 At Jagori, I had the opportunity to witness and
participate in this process directly. The research stage of a PIL action
requires an excavation of legal precedent and objective findings to
support the suit.
When the research is finished, the suit is ready to be litigated.
Often, victims who are the subject of the suit are heard in the
courtroom. Occasionally, however, the lawyers advocating on behalf of
the victims have had no real contact with the injured parties, relying on
the evidence gathered through the efforts of NGOs or available in media
reports.
Furthermore, the proceeding itself is technically nonadversarial.
Despite the connotations of the phrase "nonadversarial" in Western settings,
the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted PIL as "not in the nature of
adversary litigation but [as] a challenge and an opportunity to the
government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful...."31
28. Susman, supra note 9, at 73.
29. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 813 (India).
30. It is not uncommon for individual states to have their own Legal Aid committees to
assist in the fact-finding and investigation process of PIL actions, exemplifying just how
"nonadversarial" the process really is. See Susman, supra note 9, at 78.
31. Bandhua,A.I.R. 1984 S.C. at 811.
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The remedies stage of a PIL suit is the most contentious stage of the
dispute, as the courts have afforded themselves extensive leeway in
deciding which remedies are appropriate. Some of the remedies the
courts construct include the creation and implementation of regulations,
the establishment of free legal services, and the formation of
administrative bodies to oversee the remedies ordered. It is this stage of
the PIL suit that attracts criticism that the courts are usurping the
authority of the legislature by creating laws.
II. LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY
32
Liberalism today is "almost invariably coupled with democracy,"
33
In a liberal democracy, certain
while simultaneously constraining it.
inviolable freedoms (those that cannot be compromised through the
democratic process) are necessary for the success of a democracy.
Liberal democracies around the world exhibit characteristics that are
unique to the countries they inhabit; thus it is difficult to articulate a
theory of liberal democracy that applies to all nations. For example,
while the United States considers gun ownership rights to be important
34
fundamental rights, other nations do not.
David Held recognizes two models of the liberal democratic
tradition: "protective" democracy and "developmental" democracy. 35 The
protective model of democracy "holds that, given the pursuit of selfinterest and individually motivated choices in human affairs, the only
way to prevent domination by others is through the creation of
accountable institutions," while a developmental model of democracy
emphasizes the political process as a means to achieving the promotion
of an "active, informed and involved" demos.3 6 Both are relevant to
Indian democracy, as elements of both can certainly be found in India;
however the protective model is more applicable, considering the role of
the judiciary as a mechanism for "protecting" citizens from government
tyranny.
The critical elements of a protective model of democracy include an
emphasis on sovereignty resting with the demos (through a

32. Marc F. Plattner, From Liberalism to LiberalDemocracy, in DEMOCRACY: A READER 58,
58 (Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner eds., 2009).
33. See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOcRATIC PARADOX 10 (2000) (discussing the
conflict inherent in democratic politics).
34. See, e.g., Christopher D. Ram, Living Next to the United States: Recent Developments in
Canadian Gun Control Policy, Politics, and the Law, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279
(1995).
35. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOcRAY 5 (1996).
36. Id. at 75 (Held refers to the demos as the voting contingent of a republic).
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representative assembly);3 7 the securing of certain freedoms as
individual rights (especially rights to freedom of speech, association,
and belief) subject to legal or constitutional protection; 38 and an
institutional separation of powers between the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches. 39
A. Sovereignty
One of the significant elements of a successful protective democracy
stresses the capacity of the individual to be the "master of his [or her]
destiny"; to exercise the freedom to choose one's own path. 40 Liberalism
may be defined as "the attempt to uphold the values of freedom of
choice, reason, and toleration in the face of tyranny, the absolutist
system, and religious intolerance." 41
A truly liberal system, one in which individuals are truly
unrestrained and free to do what they wish, is both unrealistic and
dangerous. 42 Therefore, according to a liberal theory of democracy, this
freedom is limited to some extent by relinquishing some liberties in
exchange for a system of government that acts in the interests of its
citizens. Furthermore, individuals, in exercising their autonomy, choose
the government representation that best. reflects their interests. The
institutions created in a liberal democracy derive their legitimacy by
affording individuals the right to dispense with their representatives in
the event of dissatisfaction.
Finally, the extension of suffrage to all citizens is crucial to the
legitimacy of the democracy and to ensuring that all voices are
communicated in the political discourse. While history in the Western
tradition of democracy has demonstrated a preference for white male
property owners as the sole decisionmakers, 43 the emergence of cultural
and racial pluralism as a customary norm in the twentieth century has

37. See id. at 76 (discussing Hobbes view of individual bargaining for rules to enforce
natural laws in the absence of a common power).
38. See id. at 78.
39. See generally id. at 82-88 (discussing the concept of separation of powers by
analyzing Montesquieu's views on a reformed representative government).
40. Id. at 73.
41. Id. at 74.
42. According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, in which individuals enjoy their
unfettered freedoms, life "is solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Id. at 76 (quoting
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968)).
43. Deseriee A. Kennedy, Judicial Review and Diversity, 71 TENN. L. REV. 287, 294
(2004).
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seriously undermined that tradition. Today, a theory of democracy relies
44
heavily on citizenship as a distinguishing marker for suffrage rights.
B. Individual Rights
Another necessary element of protective democracy is the guarantee
of certain democratic rights that are critical to the means of securing
control of the collective decisionmaking process. These rights are
generally expressed negatively, providing freedom from government
interference. David Held identifies several political and civil rights
guaranteed in a protective democracy: the right to free speech,
expression, association, voting, and belief.45 These rights draw
boundaries around the state from invading the private realm. That
which is public, or confined to the territory defined by those boundaries,
46
is the political domain: governmental activity and institutions.
Moreover, those rights subject to legal or constitutional protections
are vital to maintaining efficiency in the marketplace of ideas. The
liberal democratic tradition is predicated on the unfettered competition
of ideas in the public discourse, so that the policy best fit for a state's
citizens is one that survives the struggle and emerges from the market.
C. Separationof Powers
In The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu articulated a strict demarcation
of state power "between the executive, the legislature, and the
judiciary," arguing that liberty would be negligible "were the same man
or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise
those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public
resolutions, and of trying causes of individuals." 47 Under this scheme,
power is divided equally among the branches so that no one branch can
impose itself on the others.
Traditionally, under a theory of liberal democracy, the judiciary
serves to provide protection to the rights enshrined in a constitution or
in historical precedent and interprets the laws enacted by the popularly
elected legislature. 48 Under the aegis of the judiciary, citizens of a
liberal democratic state are guaranteed protection of their rights to due
process and equal justice before the law.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See HELD, supra note 35, at 77.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 85 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 69 (1952)).
See id. at 86.
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III. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA

The Republic of India reflects the essential qualities of a liberal
democracy, albeit with an exceptionally robust judiciary. The Indian
Constitution, adopted in 1950, divides state power into three branches
of government: the executive (composed of a titular President, the
Council of Ministers, which is headed by the Prime Minister, and the
bureaucracy), a bicameral legislature (divided between the Lok Sabha
and the Rajya Sabha), and the judiciary (with a Supreme Court at the
peak of the system). 49 In addition, the Constitution recognizes a set of
inalienable rights protected from the vagaries of the three branches of
government.
Yet, PIL in India challenges the conceptual underpinnings of a
conventional understanding of liberal democracy in at least three
powerful ways: (1) the empowerment of the individual through collective
action; (2) a strong emphasis on the creation of positive rights through a
broad rendering of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution;50 and (3) a
blurring of the traditional circumscriptions of the powers of government.
In each of these ways, the Indian judiciary has refashioned the
traditional model of liberal democracy to adjust to the demands of
India's widespread and entrenched financial and social inequalities.
A. Collective Action
Liberal democratic theory places substantial emphasis on the rights
of the individual. It is the individual in the protective model of
democracy whose constitutional rights are protected from state
interference, and it is the individual who approaches the judiciary for
relief. This emphasis is exemplified in the U.S. tradition when the
Supreme Court expressed the requirement that "a party seeking review
must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected . . .,51
The Indian focus, while recognizing individual rights, stresses
collective action in empowering the individual. In commenting on the
difference between public interest action in India and the Anglo-Saxon
traditions, Justice Bhagwati said of the latter that it is "transactional,
highly individualistic, concerned with atomistic justice incapable of
responding to the claims and demands of collectivity, and resistant to

49. See ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. & STANLEY A. KOCHANEK, INDIA: GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS IN A DEVELOPING NATION 64, 69-122 (2008).
50. While other Articles have been employed to address rights violations, for the
purposes of simplicity, I am relying only on Article 21.
51. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972).
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change."52 PIL in India, on the other hand, is concerned with "enforcing
collective rights, an objective that is inconsistent with a private rights
53
model of public law litigation."
The emphasis on collective rights is demonstrated in many Supreme
Court decisions handed down since PIL began three decades ago. One
particular case emphasizing collective rights was Visaka v. Rajasthan,a
case in which the Supreme Court promulgated procedures concerning
the sexual harassment of women in the workplace. A woman named
Bhanwari Devi was working as a social worker for the State of
Rajasthan when five male members of the community raped her. 54 The
rape was prompted by her attempts to expose the marriage of a oneyear-old girl in the rural Rajasthani village. All of the assailants were
tried for the offense of rape, but acquitted because the judge did not find
credible evidence "that upper caste men would rape a lower caste
woman." 55 Visaka, a social action group, moved the Supreme Court to
establish guidelines for protecting women from sexual harassment in
the workplace in the absence of such legislation. In executing the order,
Chief Justice J.S. Verma stated:
The primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and
dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of
a mechanism for its enforcement is of the legislature and
the executive. When, however, instances of sexual
harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights
of women workers under Articles 14, 19, and 21 are
brought before us for redress under Article 32, an
effective redressal requires that some guidelines should
be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the
56
legislative vacuum.
Visaka represents a collective solution to rights abuses. While prior
to this case, specific legislation regulating the sexual harassment of
women in the workplace did not exist, female government workers were
presumed to be protected by the Indian Constitution's right to equality
in Article 14. However, the government's failure to enforce its own
constitutional safeguards prompted the judiciary to intervene.
Naina Kapur, the lawyer acting on behalf of Bhanwari Devi, became
"[f]rustrated by the criminal justice system's inability to provide
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Bhagwati, supra note 8, at 570.
Agarwal, supranote 7, at 691.
Sood, supra note 24, at 866.
Id. at 867.
Visaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
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tangible remedies, restore the dignity of the victim, address systemic
issues, and create widespread social change . . . ."57 The frustration
Kapur experienced translated into a determination to "focus on the big
picture" by filing a PIL action in the Supreme Court to investigate and
address sexual harassment in the workplace.5 8 During the PIL, Kapur
and other lawyers collaborated to demonstrate a pattern of sexual
harassment of women in the workplace by "providing examples of five
other women who had experienced sexual assault in the course of
employment." 59
The collective solution to the rights abuses detailed in Visaka is but
one example among many in India. The transition from the emphasis on
the individual in the traditional liberal democratic tradition to the
collective represents an effective method of confronting widespread
rights abuses, like those discussed in Visaka. Because of the
government's failure to prosecute Bhanwari's assailants, the petitioners
made the decision to attempt to obviate future abuses of women in the
workplace. It is in this sense that the individual is empowered through
the elaboration of collective rights.
B. Creationof Positive Rights
The theory of liberal democracy regards rights as negative
entitlements against the state. 60 These "rights from" relegate the
private sphere beyond the ambit of the courts. Furthermore, the notion
that "rights are individual 'trumps' against collective goals and
decisions limits the potential for requiring positive action even of public
authorities." 61 Thus, even where legislative inertia inhibits operation of
the state, the "notions of the separation of powers and the distinction
between legislation and adjudication" discourage any extensive degree
62
of judicial involvement.
In applying a broad rendering of Article 21, the Court has added
several unenumerated rights, such as the right to privacy 63 and the
right to food (discussed below). The Court will justify its actions on the
grounds that the right to life entails a right to livelihood, and the "right

57. Sood, supra note 24, at 867.
58. Id. (quoting Telephone Interview with Naina Kapur, Director, Sakshi, in New
Delhi, India (Apr. 10, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. See HELD, supra note 35, at 98.
61. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India:
Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 501 (1989).
62. Id.
63. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 495 (India).
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to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it," including
"the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on
such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression
64
of the human self."
The Right to Food Case, a continuing case as of March 12, 2012,
provides an illustration of how courts read rights into Article 21.65 In
November of 2001, the Supreme Court ordered all state governments to
implement food disbursement programs to supply the underprivileged
with access to grain. Additionally, the Court ordered the state
governments to provide subsidies to certain impoverished sectors of the
population when the primary breadwinner of the household dies. The
Court also appointed several commissioners to ensure that the
directives were implemented. In that case, the Court justified its
intervention, stating:
The anxiety of the Court is to see that the poor and
destitute and the weaker sections of the society do not
suffer from hunger and starvation. The prevention of the
same is one of the prime responsibilities of the
Government-whether Central or the State. Mere
66
schemes without any implementation are of no use.
The finding of unenumerated rights demonstrates a dramatic level
of intervention in social and economic rights cases. 67 Undoubtedly,
lowering the threshold for standing has allowed for this proliferation of
rights cases, thereby providing those who previously lacked the
financial means of approaching the Court with a significant incentive to
do so. The creative, or "activist," interpretation of fundamental rights is
unique to India because of the nation's great disparities in access to
justice. Indeed, by liberally applying Article 21 to create new regimes of
rights and by lowering the threshold for standing, the Court is leveling
68
the playing field and rebalancing "the scales of justice."
One spectacular development in the articulation of new rights in
India occurred just over one year ago when the Delhi High Court struck
down section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, or the anti-sodomy laws.
The significance of the decision does not reside in rejection of the law

64.
65.
(2001)
66.
67.
68.

Mullin v. Administrator, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529 (India).
See Petition for Writ, People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors.,
(No. 196) (India).
Id.
See Robinson, supranote 5, at 44.
Cassels, supra note 61, at 498.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA

itself, but the language employed in expressing why the law should be
struck down:
If there is one constitutional tenet that can be said to be
[sic] underlying theme of the Indian Constitution it is
that of "inclusiveness." This Court believes Indian
Constitution reflects this value deeply ingrained in
Indian society, nurtured over several generations. The
inclusiveness that Indian society traditionally displayed,
literally in every aspect of life, is manifest in recognizing
a role in society for everyone. Those perceived by the
majority as "deviants" or "different" are not on that score
excluded or ostracized. 69
While the ruling itself was decided on privacy grounds, the language
of the ruling suggests the future recognition of other rights for India's
LGBT population. On the one-year anniversary of the ruling in July
2010, I was able to attend a rally for LGBT rights. I spoke with many
attendees, who universally expressed optimism in future recognition of
their rights to marriage and freedom from discrimination. Furthermore,
the high-profile nature of the case thrust the issue into the public
discourse in a manner welcomed by members of the LGBT community.
By striking down the anti-sodomy laws, the Delhi High Court in a
sense triggered public awareness of those rights, which is a critical
element of pursuing PIL actions. Especially when confronting largescale rights issues, such as gender equality and rights for LGBT people,
lawyers recognize that they must "build public opinion to have a support
base when going to Court," as "judges are not cut off from what is
happening around them." 70 Again, this need to build public support
reflects the "Indian emphasis on the collective," in pursuing the
71
recognition of rights.
C. Institutional Challenge to the Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court's (and the states' High Courts') willingness to
supersede the legislature in the case of legislative inertia and neglect
runs contrary to the essential liberal democratic element of a separation
of powers. In this sense, the courts have faced passionate criticisms

69. Petition for Writ, Naz Found. v. Gov't of NCT of Delhi, (2009) (No. 7445/2001),
130 (India).
70. Sood, supranote 24, at 896.
71. Id.
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from various participants in the political sphere for a method of
decisionmaking that is traditionally left to the politically accountable
legislative branch. These criticisms are based on fears of judicial
despotism: that the unelected bodies will overwhelm the elected
institutions, thereby creating a judicial dictatorship.
One case that received such criticism was M.C. Mehta v. State of
Tamil Nadu, in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of child
labor in matchstick manufacturing enterprises.7 2 In tackling the matter,
the Court articulated an elaborate set of guidelines and regulations,
including enjoining the state to provide free and compulsory education
for children below the age of fourteen and a scheme of fines for offending
employers.
Justice Balakrishnan has justified the actions of the judiciary by
admonishing the legislature for its failure to address rights abuses:
It is often argued that the Supreme Court should
maintain restraint and should not violate the legitimate
limits in the exercise of powers. However, this argument
fails to recognize the constant failures of governance
taking place at the hands of other organs of State, and
that it is the function of the Court to check balance and
73
correct any failure arising out of any other State organ.
The Court's inclination to dispense justice in a manner that borders
"legislative" blurs the periphery separating it from the legislature
because the legislature has failed to execute its own duties. In filling the
void created by the legislature, the judiciary sees itself participating in
and shepherding social transformation.
While the role of the judiciary in this capacity obfuscates the
separation of powers in a liberal democratic model, the purpose of
"legislating" from the bench is to promote the disadvantaged segments
of society so that they can lend their voices to the political dialogue and
participate in the democratic process in a more meaningful way. Indeed,
there is a danger in sitting idly while rights abuses go unchecked: "If
the courts cannot, or will not, give relief to people who are in fact
concerned about a matter then they will resort to self-help, with grave
74
results for other persons and the rule of law."

72. M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 699 (India).
73. Robinson, supra note 5, at 16-17 (quoting Shri K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of
India, Address at Kerala Legislative Assembly, Golden Jubilee Celebrations 2007-08,
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In addition, the popular support of the judiciary provides legitimacy
to its institutional capacity to address rights abuses and steer public
policy. Indeed, by challenging the normative framework of institutional
barriers, the courts in India retrieve a "degree of popular moral support
at the same time that other social and political institutions are facing a
legitimation crisis." 75 The doctrine of the separation of powers
presupposes that each branch possesses a degree of legitimacy and
popularity; however, when one or more of the branches lacks that
support, "the assumption of a political role beyond that traditionally
ascribed to the judiciary may not undermine, but indeed enhance its
76
credibility and support."
IV. EXPANSION

OF

Locus STANDIAS A PARADIGM FOR OTHER
DEVELOPING NATIONS

The signature element of PIL in India is its expansion of locus
standi to move the Supreme Court or one of the State's High Courts.
The extremely liberal rendering of locus standi in India allows for any
individual to move the courts on behalf of the individual or on behalf of
another. The only rule is that the individual must assert a violation of a
fundamental right. This uniquely Indian legal mechanism serves to
provide a voice to the disadvantaged and socially immobile elements of
India by democratizing access to the courts. Lowering the threshold has
allowed for a multitude of suits to address social, economic, civil, and
political rights abuses in India. The judiciary in India has recognized
itself as a critical actor in legitimating the rule of law and instilling
confidence in the demos that their rights will be protected.
This paradigm of PIL works 77 in India because of frequent gridlock
in the legislature, which fails to pass critical laws necessary to the
welfare of the citizenry, of which a sizable portion are very poor.
Moreover, the purpose of the standing expansion serves as "a matter of
public accountability against corruption and, in human political terms,
78
as giving more of India's populace access to the legal system."
While other nations, such as South Africa and Brazil, have
interventionist judiciaries that guarantee social and economic rights, 79
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the locus standi expansion in India sets it apart from other developing
countries. However, the Indian model of standing could serve as a
source of protecting the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized in
other nations.
The Indian model performs well because of its emphasis on
collective action. In developing nations, large populations often are
subject to government neglect, which results from circumstances similar
to those in India. An emphasis on the "group" as a source of PIL focus
can uplift and emancipate entire communities. Additionally, this
emphasis incentivizes collaboration among social action groups to work
on behalf of the underprivileged sections of society, which assists in
more equitably distributing the inherent costs of litigation.
By providing new checks on the representative institutions, the
courts can address the needs of the poor populations. This concept is
foreign to the U.S. experience precisely because the United States does
not exhibit the characteristics of a developing nation that necessitate
such action. Moreover the U.S. emphasis on the individual fails to
consider widespread rights abuses that affect entire communities.
However, the procedural transformation could succeed in developing
countries where legal aid is minimal and great disparities in access to
resources prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION

PIL serves a vital function in Indian democracy by redistributing
justice and providing access to the courts. When confronting a fractured
Parliament, a bewilderingly complex bureaucracy, legislative inertia,
and severe corruption, the judiciary can effectuate systemic change. The
judicial "usurpation" of the policy and administrative functions of the
legislative branch may be the answer to addressing rights abuses and
disparities and dispensing social justice.
According to the liberal democracy model, the securitization of
rights is an essential element to the success of democracy. PIL in India
provides a voice to the disadvantaged and underprivileged. The
guarantee of access to the courts through the lowered threshold ensures
that those segments of the population are able to assert their interests
and contribute to the public discourse.8 0 In this sense, PIL redistributes
justice in an effort to level the playing field.
The PIL mechanism in India represents an era in the history of
democracy in which the judiciary establishes "principles and norms to

80. It should also be noted that, despite vast disparities in resources, India does not
suffer from a lack of voter enthusiasm. See Robinson, supranote 5, at 9.

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA

control both parliament and the executive," thereby distorting the
traditional liberal understanding of democracy.8 1 This mechanism may
serve as a model for other developing nations to pursue in their efforts
to address the needs of the disadvantaged sections of society, thereby
contributing to the prosperity of democratic institutions.

81. Id. at 58.

